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Approved For Release 2000/03/01 : CIA-RDP85-00487R000300490054

TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

1 OF 1

1 MARCH 1972

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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

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Confidential

1 MARCH 1972
(VOL. XXIII, NO. 9)

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FBIS TRENDS
1 MARCH 1972

CONTENTS

Topics and Events Given Major Attention 1

PRESIDENT'S CHINA TRIP

Peking Withholds Comment Beyond Reportage, Communique 1
Moscow Sustains Wait-and-See Stance Tinged with Skepticism 6
Prague, Sofia, Warsaw Stress "Element of Anti-Sovietism" 8
More Measured Comment from Budapest, Reticence from GDR 9
Bucharest SCINTEIA Carries Second Article Welcoming Trip 10
Tirana Conveys Cool Reaction in Meager, Terse Coverage 11
Havana Registers Hostility in Polemical Reportage 11

INDOCHINA

DRV Media Suppress Mention of PRC During President's Visit 14
DRV Continues Attacks on President, Rebroadcasts Articles 15
Moscow Scores PRC's Indochina Stand, Reiterates USSR Support . . . 18
DRV Spokesman Scores U.S. Strikes in DMZ, Quang Binh 20
DRV Army Journal Appraises Balance of Forces in Indochina 20

MIDDLE EAST

USSR Says Israeli Attacks on Lebanon Timed for Jarring Talks . . . 22
Mazurov Delegation Concludes Agreements During Syrian Visit . . . 25

STRATEGIC ARMS

Bulgarian, Hungarian Articles Refer to Soviet ABM Capability . . . 28

HUNGARY-ROMANIA

New Treaty Signed; Kadar Lectures Romanians on Soviet Role . . . 29

CHINA INTERNAL AFFAIRS

NCNA Announces Death of Szechwan Chief Chang Kuo-hua 32

CONFIDENTIAL

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FBIS TRENDS
1 MARCH 1972

- i -

TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 21 - 27 FEBRUARY 1972

<u>Moscow (3090 items)</u>			<u>Peking (1813 items)</u>		
CPSU Resolution on	(--)	10%	Domestic Issues	(36%)	46%
50th Anniversary			Nixon Visit	(1%)	17%
of USSR's Founding			Indochina	(25%)	10%
China	(12%)	10%	PRC-Malta	(--)	4%
[Nixon Visit	(--)	5%]	Diplomatic		
Indochina	(11%)	10%	Relations		
Luna 20	(2%)	6%			
DPRK Foreign Minister	(--)	5%			
in USSR					
Mazurov in Syria	(--)	5%			

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENLS
1 MARCH 1972

- 1 -

PRESIDENT'S CHINA TRIP

PEKING WITHHOLDS COMMENT BEYOND REPORTAGE, COMMUNIQUE

PRC media provided extensive, straightforward coverage of the President's visit without accompanying commentary, leaving the reportage on the visit and the joint communique to speak for themselves. During this time Peking showed restraint in its treatment of the United States generally, originating no substantial comment centering on U.S. policies while carrying low-level propaganda on Indochina developments and picking up foreign comment critical of the United States. Peking's last major comment on U.S. policy was the 20 February PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article deploring the U.S. air attacks on North Vietnam.

The joint communique was released by NCNA's domestic and international services at 1200 GMT 27 February and simultaneously broadcast on the Peking radio's national hookup program. PEOPLE'S DAILY carried the text on the 28th, and Radio Peking has widely broadcast the communique in its foreign services. Typifying Peking's coverage of the visit, the PRC television network carried reportage from 22 through 29 February, on the latter date providing 20 minutes of coverage of the Shanghai activities and the President's departure for home. Chinese television on 1 March juxtaposed a repeat broadcast of Mao's meeting with the President--originally carried on 22 February--and coverage of Chou En-lai's departure from Shanghai and return to Peking on 29 February. The juxtaposition of the Mao-Nixon meeting and a rousing welcome for Chou seemed designed to convey a sense of satisfaction over the conduct of the Chinese side in receiving and negotiating with a leader once reviled as "the chieftain of U.S. imperialism."

Peking's account of Chou's triumphant return from Shanghai presented a sharp contrast to the factual and noncommittal characterization of the President's arrival in Peking and subsequent activities. NCNA depicted "a scene of jubilation" at the airport, which was "alive with warm expressions of revolutionary unity and vigor," as a crowd of more than 5,000 people beat drums and gongs, waved bouquets, and shouted "warm welcome." Sounding a note of unity behind the demarche dramatized by the President's visit and particularly his

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
1 MARCH 1972

- 2 -

meeting with Mao, NCNA said the crowd expressed "firm support for Chairman Mao's revolutionary line in foreign affairs." Another slogan called for unity of the proletariat and "oppressed people and nations all over the world," but there were no directly anti-U.S. themes.

Among those greeting Chou were three Politburo members--Chiang Ching, Yeh Chien-ying, and Li Hsien-nien--who participated in the President's visit, plus Yao Wen-yuan, a Politburo member and number two man in Shanghai, whose last reported appearance was on 27 January when he met a delegation of the Socialist Party of Puerto Rico. Chang Chun-chiao, the Shanghai party chief and host to the President as Shanghai revolutionary committee chairman, saw Chou off in Shanghai.

As of 1600 GMT 1 March, Peking has not reported President Nixon's arrival in Washington.

LEADERS' TOASTS The toasts at the 25 February banquet in Peking, as in the case of Chou's banquet on the first day, were carried textually by Peking, but the toasts given in Hangchow were barely cited and the President's Shanghai toast was carefully excerpted. NCNA's account of the President's toast at the 27 February Shanghai banquet omitted his more ebullient remarks on the significance of the China visit. Thus, NCNA omitted his reference to "the week that changed the world" and his remark that the communique "will make headlines around the world tomorrow." NCNA quoted his remarks that "we can build that long bridge" across 16,000 miles and 22 years of hostility and that the words of the communique are a beginning "but the actions that follow must be in the spirit that characterized our talks." NCNA omitted the last half of his toast, including his remarks that "our two peoples tonight hold the future of the world in our hands" and that "generations in the years ahead will look back and thank us for this meeting that we have held in this past week."

Chou's toast at the 25 February Peking banquet given by the Nixons was briefer and in a notably more somber key than at the banquet he gave on the 21st. On both occasions Chou acknowledged "great differences" between the two sides, but on the 21st he said these differences should not hinder the two countries from establishing "normal state relations" on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence. In his toast on the 25th Chou did not refer to state relations, though

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
1 MARCH 1972

- 3 -

he associated both the government and people of China with a pledge to work "unswervingly" toward "the normalization of relations" between the two countries. The hopeful notes he sounded on the 21st--that the visit was "a positive move" and that "a new start" could be made in Sino-American relations--were absent from his toast on the 25th. Moreover, his reference on the latter occasion to "zigzags and reverses" in historical development despite a favorable "general trend" suggests a cautious, wary view in the short term.

JOINT COMMUNIQUE The agreement reached on a joint communique was reflected in the more positive tone marking Chang Chun-chiao's toast at the 27 February Shanghai banquet. Repeating Chou's observation on the 21st that the President's visit and talks represented a "positive move," Chang expressed pleasure that the two sides had reached agreement on a communique in Shanghai on the day of the visit there.

In the communique the Chinese recorded their views on a range of Sino-U.S. and Asian issues in reviewing "the international situation in which important changes and great upheavals are taking place." The notion of "great upheavals" was the keynote of the authoritative New Year's Day joint editorial and a significant cue used by Peking in the past to signal major developments.* The joint communique registered Peking's views on the following issues in reviewing the current situation:

+ "China will never be a superpower and it opposes hegemony and power politics of any kind." This line typically figures in Peking's campaign to establish common ground with what it calls the "small and medium-size nations" in opposition to "the two superpowers." The disavowal of any intent to become a superpower has also accompanied Peking's explanations of its nuclear development policy. The communique contained no explicit reference to "two superpowers."

* Peking uses the formula "great upheaval, great division, and great reorganization" to indicate a significant regrouping of political forces.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
1 MARCH 1972

- 4 -

+ Peking expressed "firm support to the peoples of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia in their efforts for the attainment of their goal" and "firm support" for the PRG's seven-point plan and its 2 February "elaboration" of "the two key problems." The expression of support for Indochinese efforts to attain "their goal" notably softens the standard formulation expressing support for their "war against U.S. aggression and for national salvation."

+ The Chinese reiterated their support for Pyongyang's eight-point program for "the peaceful reunification" of Korea and opposition to UNCURK. Peking had renewed its support for peaceful unification of Korea in late 1970 and has subsequently given authoritative endorsement to Kim Il-song's calls for "a peace pact" even prior to withdrawal of U.S. forces.

+ Peking expressed opposition to "the revival and outward expansion of Japanese militarism." The alleged revival of Japanese militarism has been a favorite whipping boy for Chinese propaganda in recent years and a peg for polemical attacks against the Sato government. During the period of preparations for the President's visit Premier Sato has been conspicuously subjected to hostile treatment while Peking has muted its criticism of President Nixon.

+ Peking reiterated its position on the Indian-Pakistani conflict, calling for troop withdrawal in conformity with UN resolutions and expressing support for "self-determination" in Kashmir.

+ Peking reaffirmed its position that the Taiwan question is "the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations" between the two countries; the PRC Government is "the sole legal government of China"; Taiwan is a province of China and the "liberation" of Taiwan is China's internal affair brooking no foreign interference; and all U.S. forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The significant 26 November 1968 PRC Foreign Ministry statement, calling for resumption of the Warsaw ambassadorial talks after the inauguration of the Nixon Administration, had cited the demand for U.S. military withdrawal as one of two basic principles governing Peking's approach to Sino-U.S. relations. In another

* According to the statement, this principle requires that the United States "undertakes to immediately withdraw all its armed forces" and military installations from Taiwan.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
1 MARCH 1972

- 5 -

major pronouncement on Sino-U.S. relations, the PLA chief of staff, speaking on the 27 June 1970 anniversary of U.S. "occupation" of Taiwan, had again cited these two principles and declared that relaxation of Sino-U.S. relations "is, of course, out of the question" because the United States refused to withdraw its forces from Taiwan.

While reciting in the communique a familiar list of offensive formulas--such as "one China, two governments"--which it believes would compromise its claim to Taiwan, Peking made no reference to the U.S.-ROC mutual defense treaty. Though PRC propaganda occasionally criticizes U.S. references to the treaty, it has not been Peking's practice to include an explicit demand for abrogation of the treaty among the conditions for normalizing relations. In contrast, Peking has publicly insisted that Japan abrogate its treaty with the ROC. Thus, a 2 October 1971 joint statement on the visit of Japanese parliamentarians seeking Peking-Tokyo diplomatic relations asserted that the Japan-ROC treaty, having been signed after the founding of the PRC, is "illegal and invalid and should be abrogated."*

The joint communique registered agreement between the two sides on the second of the two principles cited in the November 1968 and June 1970 Chinese pronouncements--that Sino-U.S. relations be based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence. The November 1968 overture to the incoming Nixon Administration had complained that for 13 years the United States had refused to reach agreement on these underlying principles--including withdrawal from Taiwan--and had put "the cart before the horse"

* In an 8 December 1954 statement on the signing of the U.S.-ROC treaty, Chou said the treaty "has no legal basis whatsoever and is null and void," but he did not demand its abrogation. Like other pronouncements on this subject, Chou demanded the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Taiwan. The difference in Peking's treatment of the two treaties may relate to the fact that the 1952 Japan-ROC pact was a peace treaty directed to ending the state of war between China and Japan. Peking's explicit demand for abrogation of this treaty may stem from an interest in clearing the decks for negotiating anew a treaty formally ending the Sino-Japanese war.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
1 MARCH 1972

- 6 -

by "haggling over side issues." If the United States continued its "current practice," the statement warned, "no result whatsoever" would come of the Sino-U.S. talks "no matter which administration assumes office in the United States."

MOSCOW SUSTAINS WAIT-AND-SEE STANCE TINGED WITH SKEPTICISM

Soviet media have sustained their cautious approach to the President's trip while projecting an attitude of suspicion and foreboding. A brief TASS report of Presidential Adviser Kissinger's press conference on the 27th pointedly ignored Kissinger's assurance that nothing had occurred during the President's visit that was aimed against Moscow. TASS waited more than 24 hours to report the joint communique, then carried a generally straightforward, nonpolemical account on the 28th. References to the "secrecy" surrounding the President's talks in Peking at the same time conveyed suspicions that the communique may conceal more than it reveals.

TASS' account of the joint communique, labeled a "Washington dispatch," noted that the document calls for the two sides to "stay in contact through various channels, including the sending of a senior U.S. representative to Peking from time to time." It also noted that the document calls for development of scientific, cultural, and other exchanges. Documenting the differences, TASS said the communique "outlines not common positions but the positions held by each side." In this context, it cited the issues of Vietnam, Taiwan, Korea, Japan, and the India-Pakistan conflict, adding: "The communique also says that there are essential differences between China and the United States in their social systems and foreign policies."

TASS in effect reported to the Soviet people that there was no movement on the question of Vietnam, noting that "the Chinese side stated its support for the PRG's seven-point proposal" while the United States "remained on its old positions." On the Taiwan issue, it cited both the Chinese view that Taiwan is "a crucial problem hindering normalization of relations between China and the United States" and the American acknowledgment that "Taiwan is part of China." The Soviet news agency quoted the American press for the view that here "the positions of the two sides have become close."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
1 MARCH 1972

- 7 -

Registering apprehensions about the completeness of the communique as a record of the Sino-U.S. talks, TASS concluded that because some of the formulations in the communique lack "clarity," many correspondents asked the President and Chou to explain various points. TASS said the President explained that he had agreed with Chou not to discuss the content of the document, commenting that "this meant the content of the talks would be kept secret." It noted that "Chou also refused to answer questions, saying it all had been answered in the communique." Prior to the communique's release, Mayevskiy had observed in PRAVDA's international review on the 27th that the Peking talks were shrouded in secrecy and cited the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR for the view that "it is possible that even the final communique will not disclose the result of the discussions."

A brief TASS dispatch on 29 February on the President's statement upon his return to Washington noted that he said "we did not bring back any written or unwritten agreements that would guarantee peace in our time." But TASS followed up this statement by citing "U.S. press" reports suggesting that the joint communique had "bypassed or left uncertain a number of problems." In this context TASS cited the WALL STREET JOURNAL for the view that "the United States and the PRC reached a certain confidential mutual understanding of which nothing is said in the communique."

Very limited followup Soviet comment on the visit includes a commentary by Andriyanov on the 29th, in Radio Moscow's "international diary" program, that focused on the passages on Vietnam in the communique and remarked that the document "makes clear the unchanged character of Washington's stand on Indochina." The theme that the President talked peace in Peking with the Chinese while the United States continued to rain bombs on Indochina has continued to thread through Moscow's propaganda. Thus Mayevskiy remarked typically in PRAVDA on the 27th that "the hullabaloo raised by the bourgeois press around the trip is unable to drown the blasts of American bombs and shells bursting over the soil of Indochina."*

* See also the Indochina section of this TRENDS for documentation of Moscow's treatment of this theme.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
1 MARCH 1972

- 8 -

Neither TASS nor monitored Radio Moscow broadcasts have yet carried a 29 February TRUD article by Repin and Stopolskiy which, judging by Western news accounts, reviews the visit in terms largely consistent with Soviet propaganda over the past two weeks but notably also charges that the Maoist leadership has engaged in a "dangerous plot with U.S. ruling circles." That the sole such overall Soviet assessment to date has appeared only in the trade union organ rather than in the party or government papers, plus the fact that the TRUD article has not been publicized in broadcast media, suggests that Moscow is still temporizing at this juncture before providing an authoritative appraisal.

In line with earlier uses of proxy comment, TASS on the 28th picked up an attack on the outcome of the trip by Japanese Communist Party (JCP) leader Tetsuzo Fuwa in the JCP organ AKAHATA. TASS quoted Fuwa as saying the communique indicates that "the United States did not take a single step in the direction of solving the Indochina question and instead took the line of relaxing tension with China while expanding the war in this area." According to TASS, Fuwa concluded that "hopes that the Chinese-American talks will result in a change by America of its course in a direction of carrying out a policy in Asia are extremely dangerous."

PRAGUE, SOFIA, WARSAW STRESS "ELEMENT OF ANTI-SOVIETISM"

After some initial restraint, the media of Moscow's Bulgarian and Polish allies joined Prague in discerning an "anti-Soviet" thrust in the joint communique on the President's trip. Prague had unhesitatingly played this theme from the outset: CTK on the 28th reported the Bratislava PRAVDA's comment that "the element of anti-Sovietism--although it is naturally not mentioned in the official communique--seems to be almost decisive for both sides." Dismissing the U.S. commitment on withdrawal from Taiwan, the commentary remarked that "the American strategists have for a long time ceased to count on Taiwan, as they have a substitute for it in the Philippines." The party daily RUDE PRAVO on the 29th added that "the main thing" the President brought back from China was "a confirmation of his preliminary calculation that Maoist China, as one of the mainstays of anti-Sovietism in the world, today is an invaluable partner for Washington's global strategists."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
1 MARCH 1972

- 9 -

Sofia, relying initially on foreign comment after the communique was released, resumed the attack on the 29th with a BTA commentary which interpreted the document's disclaimer of any agreements "directed at other states" as confirmation that Peking now "considers it possible to undertake the role of 'super-power,'" with "U.S. blessing," and that "the Sino-American collusion has been formed on the basis of anti-Sovietism." The agricultural paper ZEMEDEL'SKO ZNAME and the youth paper NARODNA MLADEZH on 1 March both concluded that the President could now count on the Chinese to refrain from any interference with his Vietnamization program.

Warsaw media, after registering initially low-keyed assessments of PRC gains at U.S. expense, carried attacks on "anti-Soviet" aspects of the final communique in the government paper ZYCIE WARSZAWY on the 29th and in the party organ TRYBUNA LUDU the next day. The former noted that the Soviet Union was not mentioned at all in the document, although it "must have been" discussed during the "30 or so hours" of talks. The latter stressed the impossibility of working for world peace "and at the same time being against the Soviet Union," adding that all "attempts to create any 'axis'" are doomed to failure. Warsaw, Sofia, and Prague commentaries continued to include remarks to the effect that the negotiations in Peking had been accompanied by U.S. bombs dropped in Vietnam--the standard refrain of Moscow's propaganda.

MORE MEASURED COMMENT FROM BUDAPEST, RETICENCE FROM GDR

Hungarian media sustained their moderate tone in commenting on the communique. Thus Budapest's MTI on the 28th carried a report from its China correspondent Baracs which noted without comment that Kissinger told his Shanghai press conference that "the relationship between the United States and China 'was not aimed against the Soviet Union,' adding that he felt that China's policy toward the United States was not aimed against the Soviet Union either." The party daily NEPSZABADSAG on the 29th assessed the Taiwan clause in the communique as "a considerable gain" for the PRC, although China "had to accept" an "indefinite" stay of U.S. forces on the island. This commentary and another the same day in a Budapest broadcast both expressed hope that the "flexibility" indicated by the President on Taiwan might also be applied in U.S. policy on Vietnam. A characteristic wait-and-see attitude pervaded both commentaries.

CONFIDENTIAL
1 MARCH 1972

- 10 -

East German media have so far carried only one original comment on the President's visit--a brief one that came out during the trip in the East Berlin weekly HORIZONT, which charged that the United States decided to negotiate with Peking only after Mao "had led China out of the socialist community and onto an anti-Soviet course."

BUCHAREST SCINTEIA CARRIES SECOND ARTICLE WELCOMING TRIP

Bucharest's party daily SCINTEIA on 1 March published a lengthy positive assessment of the Sino-U.S. communique, which Bucharest media had summarized at length on the 27th. Carried in full by AGERPRES on the 1st, with no author specified, the new article follows the pattern of Bucharest's earlier comment--by Iliescu in SCINTEIA on 23 February. Thus it applauds the Sino-U.S. negotiations as evidence of a new recognition of "realities" by Washington and as vindication of Romania's line on solution of international problems through direct contacts among "all" states, large, medium, and small, regardless of social system. Calling the trip "one of the historical events of international life," the article repeatedly refers to "justified approval," both in Romania and worldwide, of the progress toward "normalization" in U.S.-Peking relations.

Summarizing the two sides' positions as spelled out in the communique, the article uses the occasion to prod the United States to withdraw its troops "without delay" from South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia and to carry out "as soon as possible" its commitment regarding withdrawal from Taiwan, the "main obstacle" to normalizing Sino-U.S. relations.

Like the earlier SCINTEIA article, this one also endorses the President's planned trip to Moscow.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
1 MARCH 1972

- 11 -

TIRANA CONVEYS COOL REACTION IN MEAGER, TERSE COVERAGE

Tirana's apprehensiveness over the Chinese leader's reception of the President, registered obliquely before the trip in references to the impropriety of trafficking with "imperialists," was conveyed during the trip by the sparseness and terseness of its reportorial coverage--all credited to NCNA, without comment. Thus the party organ ZERI I POPULLIT and the domestic radio carried brief NCNA reports on the President's arrival and meetings with Mao. Tirana radio broadcasts for Albanians abroad featured brief NCNA dispatches covering events from the President's arrival to his departure. On the 29th Tirana radio and the Albanian news agency, ATA, cited NCNA for a factual account of the substance of the joint communique. Although Albania has a resident correspondent in Peking, Tirana media carried no dispatches attributed to him.

HAVANA REGISTERS HOSTILITY IN POLEMICAL REPORTAGE

Cuban media have maintained some restraint in their treatment of President Nixon's Peking visit but have signaled their displeasure by publicizing bitterly sarcastic reports on the trip, almost invariably juxtaposed to reports of U.S. bombing in Indochina.

Havana initially played the visit straight in both domestic and international media, carrying brief reports citing foreign news agencies on the President's departure from Washington and arrival in Peking. On the 21st the media noted that the President had met with both Mao and Chou--the first day's events that evidently triggered the high-level decision on how the media would play the trip. Cuban coverage assumed a hostile polemical cast on the 22d, keyed to a tendentious spread in the party organ GRANMA. This coverage, confined almost entirely to news accounts, suggests a desire not to unduly exacerbate relations with Peking, which have improved since the cultural revolution; at the same time, it registers Cuba's long-professed affinity for the DRV as a small embattled country, unable to count on proper support from big powers that put their own interests ahead of the struggle against "imperialism."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
1 MARCH 1972

- 12 -

PRENSA LATINA reported on the 22d that GRANMA that day carried the headlines "Cordial Nixon-Mao Interview, Friendly Chou-Nixon Welcome," and "Paper Tiger Delivers Sweet Speech in Peking." PRENSA LATINA made a point of noting that the letter "X" in President Nixon's name as usual appears replaced with the swastika "which identifies Nazism." The Cuban news agency mentioned that the same issue of GRANMA included the headlines "B-52 Planes Bomb South Vietnam Areas," "DRV Attacked Four Times Late Yesterday by Planes," and "People's Liberation Armed Forces Launch 40 Attacks on Yankees." GRANMA's political cartoon for the day, PRENSA LATINA said, included "the figure of Nixon, who appears with a waterhose spewing bombs while he speaks of peace and coexistence."

This kind of treatment was sustained. On the 26th PRENSA LATINA noted that for the "fifth consecutive day" the Cuban press devoted prominent space to the President's visit to Peking as well as to "reports from Saigon and Hanoi reporting the intensification of the war in Indochina." The agency added that "GRANMA highlights the statements by General Giap, denouncing the contradiction between Nixon's words of peace in China and the intensification of U.S. aggression in Indochina." Spelling out the official attitude more directly, the Cuban news agency added: "This same contradiction, which the Cuban press considers politically unjustifiable and ethically to be repudiated, is what GRANMA and other local news media have sought in recent days to point out to the Cuban people."

No full commentary has yet been devoted to the visit in GRANMA, nor has the subject yet been discussed by leading radio/TV commentators Gomez Wanguemert or Gonzalez Jerez. Gomez Wanguemert frequently sets the line for routine radio and television comment on major events on which the Havana regime is sensitive. But the freewheeling commentator Guido Garcia Inclan, who has personal ties to Castro and enjoys latitude that has permitted him to anticipate Castro's line or to discuss subjects ignored in other Havana media, declared over his domestic radio station* on the 26th: "What has

* Garcia Inclan broadcasts his feature programs over an ostensibly independent station not tied to the general Cuban radio network.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
1 MARCH 1972

- 13 -

surprised the world is that while the talks were being held with dances and dinners, the Yankees themselves, without shame, as if taking advantage of the opportunity--that is what it looked like--dropped shrapnel over Vietnam without pity." He added: "The Vietnamese were forced to cancel the Paris talks; Mao should have done the same thing."

On the 28th a PRENSA LATINA dispatch from Shanghai provided a generally straightforward account of the joint communique, prefaced by the observation that "the United States seems to have taken a forward step in the normalization of relations with China when it said that it would not challenge the thesis that Taiwan forms part of the territory of China." PRENSA LATINA's correspondent had been filing regular dispatches on the visit, largely devoid of editorial interjections.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

1 MARCH 1972

- 14 -

INDOCHINA

DRV media during the past 10 days have behaved in a fashion that seemed clearly to reflect their pique and concern over President Nixon's trip to Peking.* In a striking departure from its usual practice, VNA failed to promptly report the 19 February PRC Foreign Ministry statement which had supported the DRV Foreign Ministry statement protesting the 16-17 February air strikes against North Vietnam. That Hanoi was waiting for indications of the results of the President's trip is suggested by the fact that it waited until 1 March to report the PRC statement and by its apparently time-marking behavior during the past week, rebroadcasting polemical articles from earlier in the month implicitly critical of the President's trip. In an unusual step, Hanoi radio rebroadcast, from 25 through 29 February, Commentator articles which had been published in the party daily NHAN DAN on the 7th, 10th, and 14th. During the past week both NHAN DAN and the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN continued to publish articles under the byline Commentator which were critical of the President and his policies but lacked the earlier polemical overtones.

Peking's restraint in its treatment of the United States during the President's visit was demonstrated by its expression of support in the Sino-U.S. communique for efforts by the Indochinese peoples to attain "their goal," rather than the standard formulation expressing support for their struggle "in the war against U.S. aggression." PRC media have carried low-level propaganda mentioning the U.S. role in Indochina in passing and have reported foreign comment critical of the United States, but Peking has offered no substantial comment on Indochina since the President's arrival in China.

Routine Moscow comment throughout the President's Peking visit continued to warn of a possible backstage Sino-U.S. deal on Vietnam. But TASS, in summarizing the joint communique on the 28th, observed that on Indochina and other international problems the document outlined "not common positions but the positions held by each side." Followup Soviet press comment is not available at this writing, but routine broadcasts criticize the "unchanged" U.S. stand outlined in the communique.

DRV MEDIA SUPPRESS MENTION OF PRC DURING PRESIDENT'S VISIT

Hanoi media not only continued to maintain total silence on the President's trip to Peking but seemed to go to extraordinary lengths to avoid references

* The Hanoi radio and press have studiously avoided any mention of the President's trip. However, a VNA Vietnamese-language Morse transmission which consists largely of foreign press pickups--and is assumed to be an information service for selected cadres--carried reports on the President's visit, largely from Western sources but including NCNA's report of the joint communique.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
1 MARCH 1972

- 15 -

to China. Thus, Hanoi media ignored until 1 March the 19 February PRC Foreign Ministry statement supporting the DRV's protest over the 16-17 February U.S. air strikes. Normal practice would have been to report the Chinese statement immediately. This practice was followed most recently in Hanoi's prompt reports of the 4 February PRC Government statement that supported the PRG's 2 February statement elaborating its peace proposal and of the 29 December PRC Foreign Ministry statement that protested the sustained U.S. air strikes. In addition to suppressing the latest PRC Foreign Ministry statement, VNA's English-language transmissions and the VNA review of the Hanoi press have avoided any mention of China since 5 February when the Government statement was reported. On the other hand, there were frequent mentions of the Soviet Union during this period, including the reports in the press review that the papers had cited support from Brezhnev on the 19th and Kosygin on the 23d.

In its 1 March acknowledgment of the PRC Foreign Ministry statement, VNA obscured the fact that its report was belated by omitting the first paragraph of the Chinese statement, which had specified that the strikes against the DRV being protested were those of 16 and 17 February. Moreover, while VNA would normally have reported the protest in a separate item, in this case it lumped it with other communist protests, including a 22 February DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement which had already been promptly reported by VNA at the time. In quoting the Chinese statement, VNA included its expression of support for the Indochinese peoples "in their war against U.S. aggression and for national salvation"--a standard Chinese formulation that was notably absent from the Sino-U.S. communique, which instead recorded Chinese support for the Indochinese people's efforts to attain "their goals."

DRV CONTINUES ATTACKS ON PRESIDENT, REBROADCASTS ARTICLES

The Hanoi press persisted in its attacks on the President's policies during his week in Peking, with Commentator articles in NHAN DAN on the 25th and in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 27th and 28th. These new articles were not marked by the personal abuse at the level of other recent articles, some of which have been rebroadcast currently. But in an unusual move, the VNA reviews of the Hanoi press for the 27th and 28th reported that "two cartoons were published in the papers, one showing Nixon holding

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

1 MARCH 1972

- 16 -

a knife between his teeth and a bomb in his hand, and the other representing his face framed by a bomb and waving an olive branch."*

During the past week the media also publicized pro forma criticism of U.S. policies by Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap (at a 23 February reception marking Soviet Army-Navy Day) and by Politburo member Truong Chinh (at the "recent" second party congress of Nam Ha Province). Both leaders characterized the Nixon Administration's policy with such epithets as "obdurate," "tricky," "perfidious," and "crafty." In his speech as reported on the 25th, Chinh specifically referred to the U.S. eight-point peace plan, routinely claiming that it is aimed at continuing the war through Vietnamization. But Giap is reported only as scoring the Administration for talking peace while intensifying the war. Giap, as befitted the occasion, thanked the USSR for its assistance.

While on the one hand the new comment during the President's stay in Peking did not treat the President in particularly vitriolic terms or contain polemical overtones, Hanoi radio on the other hand was rebroadcasting earlier articles which did. On the 25th and 26th, Hanoi broadcast in Vietnamese to South Vietnam NHAN DAN Commentator articles published on the 7th and 10th. The one on the 7th, which previously had been reviewed by VNA, focused on U.S. conduct and escalation of the war and called the President "an utterly reactionary and ferocious hawk" who wants to settle the Vietnam problem by war. The article on the 10th harked back to the President's 25 February 1971 foreign policy report and used language similar to Truong Chinh's December speech at the Fatherland Front Congress--released belatedly in early February--when it assailed the President's readiness to negotiate with a number of countries, especially the Soviet Union and China, and charged him with attempting to split the socialist camp.

Charges of the President's alleged attempts to exploit and further divisions in the socialist camp also appeared in a 14 February NHAN DAN Commentator article entitled "Richard Nixon: His Words and Deeds," broadcast by Hanoi radio in Mandarin on the 26th and in Vietnamese to South Vietnam on the 29th. While this article is not known to have been broadcast previously by Hanoi radio, much

* The North Vietnamese frequently publish anti-U.S. political cartoons, but it is unusual for the VNA press review to mention them.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
1 MARCH 1972

- 17 -

of its content is similar to a 22 February Liberation Radio commentary in Vietnamese which, in tracing the President's career over the past 25 years, cited his role in the cold war and noted in particular his past hostility to the Chinese revolution.* Commentator observed that journalists have described the President with such terms as "superhawk, cold war combatant, a great swindler, and the Mr. Hyde of the U.S. political arena." Declaring that the President's most recent "fraudulent trick" was his eight-point plan of 25 January, the article accused him of "sabotaging" the Paris conference and failing to respond to the PRG's seven-point proposal.

ARMY PAPER ON The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN Commentator article on
EIGHT POINTS the 27th, available to date only in a VNA
 English-language summary, focused its attack
on Vietnamization. It did not mention the eight-point proposal
in referring to the President's "deceitful peace proposals."
The NHAN DAN Commentator article on the 25th, broadcast by
Hanoi radio in the domestic service and in Mandarin and carried
by VNA, did refer to the eight points, but only in saying they
are exposed as a "perfidious move" by U.S. military escalation.

It was left to the QUAN DOI NHAN DAN Commentator article on the
28th, broadcast to South Vietnam, to discuss some of the
substance of the eight points. It focused on denigrating the
proposal for elections as a way to maintain U.S. control of
South Vietnam through "continuation of a puppet government."
While earlier propaganda has acknowledged the specifics of the
U.S. proposal that U.S. troops would be withdrawn and South
Vietnamese presidential elections held six months after an
agreement is reached, Commentator now merely denigrated the
notion that Thieu would resign a month before the elections, and
he ridiculed the suggestion that the election would be organized
by an independent electoral committee under international
supervision.

Commentator insisted that it would make no difference whether
Thieu resigned one "or even three or five months" ahead of time
"as long as the Saigon puppet oppressive network is not destroyed."
The article called attention to the fact that the President,
Secretary Rogers, and Kissinger have all insisted that the

* See the TRENDS of 24 February 1972, pages 18-20.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

1 MARCH 1972

- 18 -

United States will not abandon the Saigon regime. U.S.-Saigon relations were also the topic of a NHAN DAN Commentator article on 17 February, now available in translation from the press but not known to have been carried by VNA or Hanoi radio.

While the substance of the eight points other than those on South Vietnam elections and a U.S. troop withdrawal have generally been ignored, the QUAN DOI NHAN DAN Commentator on the 28th did mention in passing the call for a cease-fire. But he dismissed it with the comment that President Nixon, in urging a cease-fire while the Americans have not ended their aggression, merely wants the Indochinese peoples "to renounce their fight for independence and freedom." The article also said the U.S. "plan" calls for "a broad U.S. program to rebuild all of Indochina."*

PARIS TALKS Hanoi media on the 27th publicized the statement by the DRV Paris spokesman the day before in which he assailed the U.S. rejection of the communist proposal that the 146th Paris session be held on 2 March--after the communists had walked out of the 145th session on the 24th. At this writing, Vietnamese communist media have not reported the 1 March statements issued by the PRG and DRV delegations again scoring the United States for refusing to agree to a session on the 2d.

MOSCOW SCORES PRC'S INDOCHINA STAND, REITERATES USSR SUPPORT

Moscow propaganda during the President's visit to China continued to suggest the possibility of a backstage Sino-U.S. deal on Vietnam. But TASS, in summarizing the Sino-U.S. communique on the 28th, observed that on a number of international problems the document outlined "not common positions but the positions held by each side." TASS noted, for example, that the Chinese side stated its support for the PRG's seven-point proposals and that the United States kept to "its old positions."

* A 29 January NHAN DAN Commentator article had also made a passing reference to U.S. aid to Indochina, without making clear that while the President mentioned it in his speech on the 25th, it is not one of the eight points.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
1 MARCH 1972

- 19 -

Moscow comment available thus far on the Indochina portion of the communique includes a 29 February Moscow domestic service commentary which complains that the United States is insisting that the basis for a settlement be the eight-point plan--a plan "rejected" by the Vietnamese. The commentary seems obliquely critical of the Chinese on two aspects of the communique: It says U.S. aggressive intentions are borne out by the communique's silence on Vietnamization, and it later points out that U.S. bombings, by which the United States hopes to "camouflage" continued participation of U.S. troops in military operations in Indochina, continued while the President was in China. Both this domestic service commentary and one for foreign audiences, also on the 29th, complain that the U.S. statement that the peoples of Indochina should be allowed to determine their own destinies does not square with the Vietnamization policy.

On the eve of the release of the communique, Soviet commentators continued to point to Peking's allegedly mild reaction to U.S. air strikes against the DRV and to cite foreign speculation that U.S. escalation was being carried out with the "tacit agreement" of Peking. Soviet media also cited foreign press speculation that the Vietnam war would be no obstacle to normalization of Sino-U.S. relations and that President Nixon would try to convince Peking to pressure Hanoi to accept his eight-point plan. Moscow domestic service and Mandarin-language radio commentaries on the 24th cited an editor of U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT as saying that "Mao is prepared to assist Washington on the Indochina question, but he cannot provide this kind of assistance openly and immediately."

At the same time that propagandists were claiming that Peking had failed to support Vietnam with anything more than words, Moscow was calling attention to Soviet support for the Indochinese. Soviet media from 24 to 26 February gave publicity to the stopover in Moscow of the DRV, NFLSV, and Pathet Lao delegates who had attended the Versailles antiwar assembly. Moscow said that on the 24th the delegates were received by CPSU Secretaries Kirilenko, Katushev, and Ponomarev, who condemned U.S. bombings of the DRV and the U.S. peace plan, supported the peace proposals of the DRV, PRG, NLHS, and FUNK,* and demanded that the United States unconditionally pull out its own and allied troops, end the Vietnamization program, and withdraw support from the Saigon regime.

* A delegate of Sihanouk's government (RGNU) had also attended the Versailles assembly but was not reported to have stopped in Moscow. Moscow has gone on record as supporting Sihanouk's front (FUNK), but it has not recognized and generally avoids mentioning the RGNU. Although Moscow gave considerable publicity to the Versailles assembly, it did not report the full text of the conference resolution, omitting its call for universal recognition of the RGNU.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

1 MARCH 1972

- 20 -

DRV SPOKESMAN SCORES U.S. STRIKES IN DMZ, QUANG BINH

The DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman on 26 February released a statement routinely condemning U.S. attacks on Vinh Linh and Quang Binh Province, and demanding "an immediate and permanent end to all acts of encroachment against DRV sovereignty and security." This is the second protest at the spokesman level following the higher-level foreign ministry statement of 17 February which scored heavy U.S. strikes on the 16th and 17th. The spokesman's protest of the 24th scored U.S. strikes from 18 to 23 February.*

The current protest charged that on 24 and 25 February, the United States "continued to bomb and shell Huong Lap, Vinh Son, and Vinh Giang villages north of the 17th parallel, in the demilitarized part of the Vinh Linh area." It further said that during the same period U.S. planes "attacked a number of locations in Quang Binh."

DRV ARMY JOURNAL APPRAISES BALANCE OF FORCES IN INDOCHINA

Despite the absence of any large-scale communist attacks in South Vietnam, Hanoi continues to publicize comment arguing that the "liberation forces" are in an advantageous position and capable of fighting major engagements. This view is pressed in a new article, attributed to the military commentator "Quyet Thang" (Determined to Win), broadcast in two installments on the 26th and 27th, and in a portion of an October 1971 article by the commentator "Cu Long," broadcast on the 27th. The Quyet Thang article, said to have been published in the February issue of the QUAN DOI NHAN DAN magazine, repeats Hanoi's contention that the allies have failed to weaken the communist forces or compel them to engage only in small battles and it adds that, "on the contrary, the liberation armed forces have launched bigger and bigger battles and won bigger and bigger victories."**

* See the 24 February TRENDS, pages 24-29.

** Quyet Thang's commentaries normally appear in the QUAN DOI NHAN DAN magazine, but he has also written articles for the party's theoretical journal, HOC TAP. His last previous article, discussing the alleged failure of Vietnamization, was published in the December issue of HOC TAP.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
1 MARCH 1972

- 21 -

The article claimed that the battles of the Indochinese armed forces and peoples have been "steadfastly interrelated" and have been "closely coordinated" and stressed the importance of the solidarity of the Indochinese forces. It held that recent Indochinese "victories" have "created an unprecedentedly strong and stable strategic position" and that "the armed forces and people in the three Indochinese countries are now able to launch important attacks in any areas at any moment of their choice." With ebullience typical of other commentaries in recent months, Quyet Thang asserted: "We are obviously in a winning strong position. We are taking the initiative in attacking the enemy. We are riding at high tide. The enemy is in a defeated, weakened, passive, defensive, and declining position."

On 27 February, the day that the last installment of the Quyet Thang article was broadcast, Hanoi's domestic service also carried the final segment of a five-part article, attributed to the military commentator "Cuu Long," which had first been publicized, in installments, by Hanoi and Front media on 17 and 18 October. This segment of the Cuu Long article pressed the argument that the revolution in South Vietnam now had unprecedented advantages while the allies faced more difficulties than ever before.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
1 MARCH 1972

- 22 -

MIDDLE EAST

USSR SAYS ISRAELI ATTACKS ON LEBANON TIMED FOR JARRING TALKS

Moscow castigates Israel for its four-day military action against Lebanon, a country which "did not even participate in the 1967 war," and raises the question in the Security Council of sanctions against Israel and of its expulsion from the United Nations. Propagandists charge that the operation in Lebanon was timed to coincide with the one-day visit to Israel, on the 25th, of UN mediator Gunnar Jarring, and note that his visit was preceded by the largest military exercises ever held in Israel. Moscow claims Israel thereby demonstrated its "from positions of strength" policy and its continuing efforts to sabotage all UN efforts to promote a peaceful settlement on the basis of Resolution 242.

Commentators point out that Israeli officials have confirmed Israel's refusal to withdraw from the occupied Arab lands. Thus an Arabic-language broadcast on the 24th asserted that Israel is prepared to respond positively neither to Jarring's 8 February 1971 memorandum calling for a return to the 1967 borders nor to the "subsequent proposal"--stemming from the Organization of African Unity's exploratory mission last fall--which "stipulates a declaration rejecting any annexation of Egyptian territory." An Aleksandrov domestic service commentary on the 27th noted that Jarring had been welcomed in his 18-20 February visit to Egypt and in his talks in Jordan on the 23d. but was unwelcome in Israel, which launched a "loud campaign" to discredit his peace-making efforts. Brief reports of Jarring's visit to Egypt stressed Foreign Minister Ghalib as stating that Egypt considers the United Nations to be the only body with whose mediation the crisis can be solved.

There is currently little attention to the issue of U.S. good offices in connection with "proximity talks" on reopening the Suez Canal. TASS on the 28th, reporting President as-Sadat's interview appearing in the 6 March NEWSWEEK, quoted him as saying the United States intends to impose an American settlement fully in line with Israel's interests. The short TASS account ignored the previous question as to the status of an interim solution on reopening the canal, and as-Sadat's reply that "under Jarring, and if linked to a final solution, the idea is alive." This was apparently Cairo's first public intimation

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
1 MARCH 1972

- 23 -

of an interest in pursuing an interim settlement through Jarring, and was followed by a remark in AL-AHRAM, as reviewed by Cairo radio on the 29th, that "the Egyptian initiative regarding the reopening of the Suez Canal through Jarring" is still valid. Moscow's commentary in Arabic on the 24th did say that while Tel Aviv is "extremely hostile" toward efforts for a political solution within the UN framework, Israeli propaganda insists such a settlement would be feasible if the Arab countries and Israel relied on the United States "as honorable mediator."

The commentary on the 24th also charged Israel and its "U.S. protectors" with trying to split the Arab ranks, bringing up the "possibility of a separate agreement between Israel and Jordan." Earlier, an Arabic-language commentary on the 19th also referred to "Israeli propaganda" rumors of Jordanian-Israeli contacts, trying to make Jordan believe Egypt was likely to conclude an agreement with Israel with regard to the Suez Canal without getting an Israeli commitment to withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories. Moscow seems thus to be indirectly countering recent reports in Israeli media of contacts between Israeli officials and Jordanian personalities, such as former Jordanian defense minister Nusaybah's "courtesy meeting" with Mrs. Meir, reported by Jerusalem radio on 10 February.

SECURITY COUNCIL TASS reports on the Council debate on
DEBATE ON LEBANON the night of 27-28 February cite Soviet
UN delegate Malik as declaring that the
Security Council is "in the right to use sanctions against
Israel, raise the question of ending economic and other relations
by UN members with the aggressor and expelling Israel from the
United Nations." Soviet propagandists have from time to time
broached the possibility of sanctions, and a discussion of the
legal aspects of "appropriate sanctions" against Israel appeared
in NEW TIMES (No. 51, December 1971). (The author, Igor
Blishchenko, had dealt with the application of international
law to the question of navigation through the Suez Canal and
the Gulf of Aqaba in an INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS article in
January 1969.) But references to expulsion have occurred
only recently and infrequently. An article in INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS last June seems to represent the first time Moscow
cited, in connection with Israel, Article 6 of the UN Charter
on expulsion of a member which has "persistently violated" UN
Charter principles. Subsequently, Moscow twice last September
attributed to Egypt's UN representative az-Zayyat a proposal
that the Security Council recommend Israel's expulsion.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
1 MARCH 1972

- 24 -

While Moscow largely ignores recent "acts of terrorism" by Palestinian fedayeen infiltrating into northern Israel from Lebanon, it has cited Chief of Staff Elazar's 24 February warning to Lebanon of retaliatory action. And Malik brushed off as hypocritical "Israel's attempts to excuse its policy of aggression" by references "to some kind of 'right' to undertake preventive measures against the Arab patriots." TASS reported Malik as stressing the need for effective support for Jarring's mission to bring about a peaceful settlement, adding that the Soviet delegation "again appealed" to the permanent members of the Security Council to resume consultations on a peaceful political settlement "and is waiting for their reply."

TASS noted that the Council unanimously passed a resolution demanding that Israel end all military action against Lebanon and withdraw its forces from Lebanese territory. The account indicated that some Council members felt the resolution to be too weak in that it did not provide for "decisive measures" against "the aggressor," but it was passed with the hope that the Council would later "discuss a complex of measures" to insure Lebanon's security and would take "effective measures against the aggressor."

PEKING NCNA on the 29th, reporting the Security Council
REPORTAGE debate, noted PRC delegate Huang Hua's objections
 to a preambular paragraph--not mentioned by TASS--
which gave the impression of "partiality toward the Israeli
Zionists." NCNA observed that when the paragraph was put to a
vote, "India and the Soviet Union and another country" abstained.

While Malik, according to TASS, made only an oblique reference to the fedayeen, Huang Hua typically gave emphatic support to the Palestinian people's "armed struggle against the Israeli Zionists," declaring that the Palestinians and other Arab peoples are "fully entitled to take up arms" to defend their right to national existence and recover their lost territories. (A broadcast by the "Voice of Fatah" from Cairo on the 27th said the Chinese ambassador in Syria had visited the general command of the Palestinian revolution forces that morning to "personally follow" the developments in the battle.)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FRIS TRENDS
1 MARCH 1972

- 25 -

A 1 March PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article carried by NCNA reiterates the Palestinians' right to fight for their lost territories "as long as Israel does not withdraw from the areas it has occupied." Mention of the United States is confined to a concluding pledge of the Chinese people's support for the Palestinians and other Arab peoples in their struggle against "the U.S. and Israeli aggressors." But NCNA on the 27th and 28th picked up Albanian indictments of the two imperialist superpowers' Middle East policies, BASHKIMI on the 26th and ZERI I POPULLIT the following day accusing the United States and the Soviet Union of "pushing their plot for a 'peaceful settlement'" in the Middle East. And NCNA on 1 March reported a commentary in Pyongyang's NODONG SINMUN "sternly denouncing" the "U.S. imperialist and Zionist aggressive acts" against Lebanon.

MAZUROV DELEGATION CONCLUDES AGREEMENTS DURING SYRIAN VISIT

The talks held by a Soviet party-government delegation in Syria 21-26 February apparently brought the Syrians no closer to supporting a political settlement of the Middle East problem on the basis of UN resolutions, but did result in the signing of various bilateral agreements and indications of a somewhat warmer atmosphere. Summing up the visit, PRAVDA's Demchenko, according to TASS on 1 March, said "important documents" were signed concerning economic cooperation, strengthening of Syria's defenses, and CPSU-Syrian Ba'th ties. According to the communique, the Soviet delegation, which was led by CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Kirill Mazurov, held talks with the Syrians in a "cordial and friendly atmosphere." Talks in Moscow a year ago, during the 1-3 February visit of then prime minister and now president Hafiz al-Asad, took place in an "atmosphere of frankness and friendship."

BILATERAL RELATIONS The Syrians and Soviets, the communique says, signed a new agreement for the extension of Soviet economic and technical assistance and further expansion of mutual cooperation during Syria's third five-year plan. The two sides, it adds, also "charted specific measures" aimed at "further

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

1 MAR 1972

- 26 -

success" in implementing economic cooperation agreements previously signed. Last February's communique had suggested that such cooperation was not altogether smooth when it recalled the importance of the Soviet-Syrian protocol of 11 June 1970 "which reflected practical problems concerning the development of cooperation."

The current communique notes that the sides reviewed prospects for deepening relations in the political, party, economic, trade, and cultural fields, but makes no mention of the military field. However, it does later mention that "feasible steps" for promoting Syria's defense capability "were discussed." And TASS on the 26th reported Mazurov as saying in a statement for the press before his departure that the sides signed "important documents" on economic cooperation, party links, and "on assistance in strengthening the defense potential" of Syria. Damascus radio on the 25th, reporting the signing of a protocol the nature of which it failed to identify, cited Mazurov as saying that through the talks "we have sought to provide the best means for boosting Syria's defensive and economic capabilities." TASS' account, describing the agreement as one on Soviet economic and technical assistance, said Mazurov noted that during the talks the sides "examined both measures for strengthening the defense capacity" of Syria and measures regarding projects in which the Soviet Union is participating, as well as "plans for the future."

As for CPSU-Syrian Ba'th ties, the communique said the sides expressed interest in further developing party relations, agreed on "practical steps" in the "next stage," and signed a program for party contacts in 1972. PRAVDA's Demchenko, in his 1 March article, observed that the exchange of party delegations and party experience will now become "even more extensive and of a more regular nature." Low-level party exchanges in the past few years have received little publicity from either side. There were only brief accounts, for example, of the seven-day visit to Syria, ending 13 February, of what TASS called a Soviet party delegation and Damascus described as a "party and agricultural" delegation. Last February's communique, noting the "great importance" of friendly party relations, said only that agreement was reached on "practical measures" regarding future interparty relations.

In addition to the main talks with Prime Minister Khulayfawi and other officials, TASS reported Mazurov as meeting with President al-Asad on the 21st, 24th, and 26th for what were apparently increasingly cordial conversations, described respectively as "warm," "warm and friendly," and "friendly and heart-felt."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
1 MARCH 1972

- 27 -

MIDDLE The sides routinely note in the communique that:
EAST continued Israeli occupation of Arab territories and
 "growing American support" for Israel increase Middle
East tension and threaten world peace. They call for Israeli
withdrawal from all occupied territories and affirm support for
the Palestinians' struggle to regain their "legitimate rights."
There is again no mention of a political settlement based on
Resolution 242, and the Soviet side unilaterally "explained the
efforts for achieving a just, speedy solution" to the crisis.

In his major speech during the visit, to the People's Assembly
on the 21st, Mazurov declared that the Soviet Union, while
endeavoring to remove the "consequences of Israeli aggression"
through a settlement based on the UN resolutions, is simultaneously
helping the Arab countries to strengthen their defensive might.
In this and another speech he explained the Soviet stand as
calling for unconditional Israeli withdrawal from "all" occupied
lands and observance of the legitimate rights and interests of
"all states and peoples" of the area, including the Palestinians.
This formulation, implying Israel's right to exist, has appeared
in the last two Soviet-Egyptian communiqués. Mazurov also stated
in a dinner speech, according to PRAVDA on the 24th, that those
who formulate U.S. policy must understand that it is not
rearmament of Israel but "a policy of a political solution" to
the Middle East problem that is the realistic approach to
insuring peace in the region. And in his assembly speech,
touching on Soviet-Syrian economic cooperation, Mazurov called
peace essential so that the people can proceed successfully
toward social progress. He went on to warn that "if a new
world war should break out now, when massive reserves of
nuclear weapons are in storage, it will be a horrible disaster
for all mankind." (This passage was edited out of the version
of the speech appearing in PRAVDA on the 23d.)

Moscow failed to win from the Syrians a condemnation of "anti-
communism and anti-Sovietism," as it just did from the Iraqis,
and from Egyptian President as-Sadat last October. The
communique merely states that the Soviet Union and the other
socialist countries are the "natural and sincere friends" of
the Arabs, and strengthening of friendship and cooperation
between them "constitutes a principal factor" in the successful
evolution of the Arab national liberation movement. As for
Arab unity, the Syrians "informed" the Soviets of the importance
of the Confederation of Arab Republics, and the Soviets in turn
expressed conviction that continuation of efforts to "unify the
Arab countries on a democratic and anti-imperialist basis and to
boost unified action" among these countries conforms with the Arab
people's interests and with the objective of removing "the
consequences of the Israeli aggression."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
1 MARCH 1972

- 28 -

STRATEGIC ARMS

BULGARIAN, HUNGARIAN ARTICLES REFER TO SOVIET ABM CAPABILITY

Articles in the Bulgarian and Hungarian press on 23 February, marking the 54th anniversary of the Soviet army and navy, are notable for direct references to a Soviet antiballistic missile (ABM) system, a subject not touched on in Soviet propaganda on the anniversary this year or in 1971. On the 1970 anniversary, articles by Defense Minister Grechko, by then Chief of the General Staff Zakharov, and by Kazakh SSR Military Commissar General Beykenov had broken a two-year reticence on the subject on the part of Soviet military spokesmen.

In Sofia's OTECHESTVEN FRONT, First Deputy Minister of National Defense and Chief of the General Staff Col. Gen. Semerdzhiev noted without elaboration that the troops of the USSR's air defense are armed with "complicated antimissile and antiaircraft missile systems, modern fighter aircraft, and the most advanced radar and automatic guidance equipment, thus insuring a reliable defense against strikes by the enemy's ballistic missiles and air force."

An article in Budapest's NEPSZABADSAG by commentator Jozsef Bojcsuk stated that the Soviet army's "large volume of nuclear missile weapons for various purposes" provides grounds for the claim that it "has a superior firepower in the broadest sense of the term" over the imperialist armies. Bojcsuk then noted that the effective range of Soviet intercontinental and "orbital" nuclear missile weapons is unlimited, concluding that the USSR also has a capability in the sphere of ABM's and multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRV's).

The last known high-level Soviet reference to the USSR's "orbital" missiles appeared in a 19 February 1969 TASS interview granted by Marshal Moskalenko on the occasion of Soviet army and navy day: As reported by TASS, he said that "some of the latest Soviet rockets are suitable for orbital launching." Soviet spokesmen are not known to have claimed a MIRV capability for the USSR.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
1 MARCH 1972

- 29 -

HUNGARY - ROMANIA

NEW TREATY SIGNED; KADAR LECTURES ROMANIANS ON SOVIET ROLE

Fresh from his visit to Moscow in mid-February, Hungarian First Secretary Kadar paid an "official friendly" visit on 24-26 February to Bucharest, where Premiers Fock and Maurer signed a new 20-year friendship treaty similar to the ones Romania has signed with the USSR and other East European countries. The visit ended with a cordial, lengthy communique reflecting aspirations on both sides for economic relations extending beyond the limits of the Soviet bloc economic structure. At the same time, Kadar lectured his Romanian hosts, at a friendship rally on the 25th, on the key importance of the Soviet Union in the defense of the socialist countries, while Ceausescu used the occasion for a new, forthright exposition of Bucharest's independent stance.

KADAR SPEECH The Hungarian leader pointed to his country's successes with its liberalized brand of socialist construction, successes which "cannot be looked down upon," at the same time underscoring for Soviet ears the assurance that "our friends can rely on us" to pursue the socialist road "while our enemies must realize that no force can lead us from that road."

Stressing the community of basic interests between Hungary and Romania, Kadar lectured that the two countries' socialist progress was only possible because "the powerful force of the socialist countries, the Warsaw Pact, and the Soviet Union jointly guard our achievements." He added that the "cornerstone" of Hungary's foreign policy "is our alliance with the Soviet Union" and that socialist unity "demands that we coordinate our concepts on important international issues." The coordination of foreign policy was embodied in the USSR-Czechoslovak treaty of 6 May 1970 but not in the bilateral treaties Romania has signed in recent years with the Warsaw Pact countries, including the present one.

In a dig at the Chinese concept regarding the United States and the Soviet Union, to which Romania has been receptive, Kadar denounced "all theories obscuring and tangling the principal lines of power in world politics," declaring "we consider it wrong to disregard the class point of view, the grouping of states--irrespective of social regimes--according to size." He said also that Hungary is combatting "opportunism, deviations

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
1 MARCH 1972

- 30 -

to the right as well as the left, nationalism, and anti-Sovietism and disruption," in accordance with the decisions of the 1969 Moscow international party conference. He suggested to the Romanians, in effect, that they line up on the proper side in the event of a showdown with Peking: "One can say that the overwhelming majority of the communist and workers parties are prepared for action for the sake of unity."

CEAUSESCU SPEECH Terming his talks with Kadar "useful and fruitful," the Romanian leader registered praise for the Soviet Union only on the score of its "contribution to the process of detente in Europe." In connection with the new bilateral treaty, he said the two countries' "fraternal solidarity" proves that "a great variety of historical conditions and specific peculiarities" cannot prevent socialist cooperation, which transcends "differences."

Registering "deep interest and warm feelings" for the Hungarians' "creative activity" in building socialism, Ceausescu went out of his way to spell out the Romanians' independent view of CEMA, in tune with the joint communique signed on the 26th. He declared that Romania's "cooperation" with the CEMA states is only part of its "many-sided cooperation with all socialist states," stressing that Romania is applying peaceful coexistence in participating in a worldwide "international division of labor, in the international exchange of assets" on the basis of independence, sovereignty, equality, and noninterference in internal affairs. He reiterated the usual Bucharest stance to the effect that the Romanian party, as "an active detachment" of the international communist movement, is doing everything possible to "settle current difficulties" and to "rehabilitate and strengthen" unity.

JOINT COMMUNIQUE The joint communique on the visit spelled out a liberalized view of CEMA, in many respects in tune with Ceausescu's approach. Kadar had avoided the subject entirely in his Bucharest speech. The document duly endorses the long-range program of CEMA integration adopted at the 25th CEMA session in Bucharest last July but adds that "at the same time, Hungary and Romania are striving to develop" economic and scientific-technical cooperation with "all the socialist states, the developing countries, and every state of the world." The similarly lengthy communique on a comparable occasion, the visit of the Polish leaders to Bucharest to sign a new friendship treaty in November 1970, had endorsed such cooperation with CEMA and "all" the socialist countries but had not extended it to "every state in the world."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

1 MARCH 1972

- 31 -

Without recording any overall claim of unanimity for the talks, the communique says that they were conducted in "a sincere, friendly atmosphere" and that the two sides "informed each other about the activities of their respective parties and governments."

TASS carried a report of the communique on the 27th, mentioning briefly the two sides' support of CEMA integration and focusing largely on passages in the document that praised the Soviet role in European detente.

NEW TREATY The new 20-year treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance--signed more than four years after the technical lapse of the previous Hungarian-Romanian pact on 24 January 1968--again underscores Romanian aloofness from coordination of foreign policy with the other Warsaw Pact states. Where the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty signed on 6 May 1970 pledges the two sides to consult each other on international questions and "act proceeding from their common position," the 7 July 1970 Soviet-Romanian treaty states ambiguously in Article 9 that the signatories will consult each other on such questions "in order to agree about their positions." Like Article 8 of the Polish-Romanian treaty of 12 November 1950, Article 8 of the Hungarian-Romanian pact merely pledges the two sides to "inform and consult" each other on international questions.

As in Romania's other recent bilateral treaties, there is of course no repetition of the agreement to "defend socialist gains," which had appeared in the USSR-Czechoslovak treaty, and the pact commits the two parties only to "cooperation"--not "integration"--under CEMA. The mutual defense clause of the new treaty, Article 7, hews closely to the wording of the other recent bilateral treaties in committing each side to "use all means at its disposal to render without delay all assistance, including military assistance," necessary to repulse armed aggression from another state or group of states.

The Romanians secured the same pledge they got from the Soviet Union and Poland--in Article 1 of this and both of the other two countries--to respect "sovereignty and independence, equality, and noninterference in internal affairs."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
1 MARCH 1972

- 32 -

CHINA INTERNAL AFFAIRS

NCNA ANNOUNCES DEATH OF SZECHWAN CHIEF CHANG KUO-HUA

Chang Kuo-hua, Szechwan's first party secretary and chairman of the provincial revolutionary committee, died of a heart attack on 21 February, according to an NCNA announcement on the 25th. Yen Cheng, a newcomer to the Szechwan power structure, presided over the memorial service held in Chengtu on the 25th. Yen was listed ahead of Li Ta-chang, the ranking provincial party secretary, and was identified for the first time as political commissar of the Chengtu Military Region (MR).

Yen apparently moved into Szechwan sometime after September 1971, when he last appeared publicly in Fukien, where he had served as a deputy political commissar within the Foochow MR since 1959. NCNA's listing of Yen ahead of Li would appear to indicate that Yen now holds at least one of the posts now vacant in Szechwan; Chang Kuo-hua held the concurrent post of first political commissar of the Chengtu MR.

The Chengtu memorial service was reportedly attended by "leading comrades" of the provincial party and revolutionary committees and the Chengtu PLA units, but only Yen and Li were specifically named in attendance--indicative, perhaps, of further dissensions among the perennially faction-ridden leadership of China's most populous province. There was no mention by NCNA nor the Chengtu radio of Liang Hsing-chu, Szechwan's second secretary and commander of the Chengtu MR, nor of five of the six provincial secretaries. Neither Liang nor the five missing secretaries have appeared publicly since last October. Li, the remaining secretary, spoke at the service and appeared with Chang at his last public appearance on 13 February. In his eulogy, Li characterized Chang as "always loyal to the party and people" and termed his death "a loss to our party."

A memorial service for Chang was also convened in Lhasa on the 25th. (Chang had long been the top leader in Tibet prior to his cultural revolution transfer to Szechwan; and subsequently the downgrading of the Tibetan MR to a military district again placed Tibet under his purview.) Lhasa radio reported that 1,500 people attended the service, including Chao Wen-chin, identified for the first time as deputy commander of the Tibet Military District,

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
1 MARCH 1972

- 33 -

and Jen Jung, first secretary and acting chairman of the provincial revolutionary committee. Chao had been listed as a responsible person within the MD since 1966.

Jen asserted, in his remarks to the gathering, that "we must learn from his (Chang's) spirit of loyalty to the party . . . and from his fine work style of being open and above-board." Recalling Chang's 1950 march into Tibet, Jen praised Chang for "returning" Tibet "to the fold of the great motherland" by overthrowing the "reactionary, sinister, savage, and barbarian feudal serf system of dictatorship by monks and nobles."

CONFIDENTIAL